Yes, I'm well aware of Kalinske's vision on this, which was part of the problem and, in my opinion, shows how SoA leadership became out of touch with gamers in the later years of Genesis.
The 32X could’ve made sense as a budget 32-bit solution if the Saturn wasn’t behind it. Customers, myself included, were very confused by Sega's strategy. This is not what people wanted. People wanted an actual 3D console.
Consolidating resources on Saturn and not fragmenting the install base would’ve been smarter, mainly because the transition to 3D has proven challenging for most developers.
Sega of Japan’s plan to go cheaper with the Genesis and focus on Saturn was more imaginative strategically and in the long term.
The infamous FY1997 documentation showed that Genesis still had decedent HW sales but weren't as strong as SoA thought, missing all their projections if memory serves me well; maybe making cheaper hardware would have helped get close to that projection…?
I'll add some food for thought:
- Sega and SoA started to work on the Saturn in '92, and by early 1994, Sega already had the final Saturn hardware nearly locked in and was preparing for a late ’94 Japanese release.
- But SoA either ignored it or didn’t know that (fully
), hoping Saturn would be delayed or positioned as a premium productwhile 32X would serve the mass market. It is almost like Saturn was the "accessory."- SoA + STI started to work on Project Mars in late 1993 (or early 1994, depending on the sources).
Now, don't take me wrong: I like the 32X (except for the product design, which is horrendous!), but if I had the magic wand to do one executive order, yeah, I would have instead moved the resources in the Saturn, prove to Sega that SoA understands the new market and plan a kick-ass launch day.
